Fukushima: has it killed nuclear power?

Date of writing: 21 March 2011

As a public service, I renounce copyright on this essay, which may be freely copied in its entirety or referenced, on condition that the URL http://www.cypenv.info/cyprusee/files/electricity/fukushima.aspx is mentioned.

If, for any reason, any country renounces nuclear-power because of what happened in north-eastern Japan, it is in denial of any logic except possibly of emotional politics. Of course, this is a paradox because emotional politics is never logical!

A number of countries, such as Germany, Sweden and Switzerland have announced that they're having a new look at whether they will ban future construction of nuclear power stations. At the same time, they have announced that they will examine closely the safety of existing power stations, in the light of the Fukushima "disaster". This implies that the politicians who have made these announcements have jumped to the conclusion that what happened at Fukushima was, in fact, an environmental disaster caused by an earthquake. It wasn't! This was a gut reaction which cannot stand the light of day. Unfortunately, this kind of bad politics makes good media reading and viewing. Worse, it misleads the grand public because it is far from the truth and is even hysteria. All sorts of stupid commentaries were added, mostly to provide political capital. This has helped nobody and could even be described as irresponsible, particularly when the comments came from the mouths or pens of people who should have known better.

Let it be made quite clear; when the Tohoku earthquake struck Fukushima, all the operational reactors closed down immediately by the insertion of control rods. At the same time, the emergency diesel generators started up automatically and provided power for the cooling systems. This was exactly what had been foreseen, despite the fact that the intensity of the earthquake was greater than had been designed for at the conception of the power station. In other words, the power station resisted the earthquake perfectly and without any damage.

What happened next was another story. Some time after the earthquake the tsunami arrived. The power station was protected by a sea wall, but this was unfortunately insufficiently high to stop the wall of water from penetrating into the grounds of the power station. The authorities had not foreseen that a tsunami could reach over 10 m in height (one unsubstantiated report has stated that the tsunami reached a height of 23 m in some places!). As the complex was built on flat ground, seawater flooded it completely. There was one design error that was the cause of all the subsequent problems of radiation leakage; the emergency diesel generators were placed in a basement and were therefore submerged by the seawater. Of course, this took them out of service. As the electric grid was also damaged, including the switchgear and transformers on-site, no power became available to run the cooling circuits. All the subsequent problems stemmed from this. It is unlikely that this would have happened with a modern plant because the emergency diesel generators would not have been placed underground and the air intakes would have been at a level which even the massive tsunami would not have reached. It must not be forgotten that these plants were designed in the 1960s, the number one reactor being commissioned in 1971. These are therefore Generation II plants, whereas modern ones would be Generation IIIa, with a whole host of improved safety features including quadruple redundancy of essential components.

There is an interesting website at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/18/fukushima_friday/ entitled "Fukushima one week on: situation stable says IAEA" with the subtitle "Shameful media panic very slowly begins to subside". I propose to make a few quotations from this article, published on 18 March 2011.

• A single very brief spike of 400 mSv per hour, recorded by an instrument near reactor No. 3 following an explosion on Tuesday, is still being widely reported as if it were the current level at the site, probably not helped by a poorly translated and somewhat belated TEPCO press release issued yesterday, which mentions it.
• Nonetheless, levels even adjacent to the stricken reactors have seldom been above 4 mSv per hour, and much lower elsewhere in the plant.
• The renowned US nuclear engineer Ted Rockwell, who quite literally wrote the book on reactor safety, has harsh words for this position.
  Yet in Japan, you have radiation zealots threatening to order people out of their homes, to wander, homeless and panic stricken, through the battered countryside, to do what? All to avoid a radiation dose lower than what they would get from a ski trip.
• Some more details on casualties thus far have been released, reported by WNN. It turns out that there has been one confirmed death, but not at the Daiichi plant at all: a worker who was in the crane cab at the separate Fukushima Daini plant (where all reactors are now confirmed to be safely in cold shutdown) was killed when the quake hit.
• Two more workers, this time at the Daiichi plant, are still listed as missing since the quake and tsunami hit. Six more required medical help following the quake, one suffering two broken legs.
• A further 15 non-radiological injuries have resulted from hydrogen explosions at the site, though some of these were minor in nature and the individuals concerned return to duty shortly after.
• As to radiation related issues, there has been one case of measurable significance. Earlier in the week when workers were still limited to a total dose of 100 mSv, one individual breached this limit during venting operations and consequently was evacuated to hospital.… Personnel are now permitted to sustain doses of 250 mSv.
• It will now be a surprise if anyone who has not been inside the plant gates this week is affected by the situation at all – apart from all the people worldwide who have been taking iodide pills or eating salt unnecessarily. There may also be measurable psychological health effects from the global media-driven hysteria surrounding the situation, of course.
• Nothing else in the quake-stricken area has come through anything like as well as nuclear-power stations, all with so little harm to the population. All other forms of infrastructure – transport, housing, industries – have failed the people in and around them comprehensively, leading to the deaths most probably in the tens of thousands. Fires, explosions and tank/pipeline ruptures all across the region will have done incalculably more environmental damage, distributed hugely greater amounts of carcinogens than Fukushima Daiichi – which has so far emitted almost nothing but radioactive steam (which becomes non-radioactive within minutes of being generated).
• And yet nobody will say after this: "don't build roads; don't build towns; don't build ships or chemical plants or oil refineries or railways". That would be ridiculous, of course, even though having all those things has actually led to terrible loss of life, destruction and pollution in the quake's wake.
• Personal bootnote
  As one who earns his living in the media these days, I can only apologise on behalf of my profession for the unbelievable levels of fear and misinformation purveyed this week. I have never been so ashamed to call myself a journalist.

The bulleted quotations above represent a small part of the article and I claim "fair use" for quoting them here. I strongly recommend that the original article be read in its totality, especially because it has been well referenced. The author, Lewis Page, is, of course, the copyright holder.

During the time that the politicians were making their announcements, they were doing nothing to alleviate the misery and the cold of literally hundreds of thousands of persons who had lost everything, often including the lives of their loved ones. At the time of writing, it is estimated that the earthquake and the tsunami may have killed 20,000 persons, probably more (the confirmed death toll from the disaster has risen to 8,450 and 12,931 people are listed as missing at this time). But the politicians were far more concerned about the hundred-odd persons who may or may not have been exposed to undue radiation. Don't get me wrong, radiation is a silent killer when it is in excess. We have no proof, at this time, that any person has been exposed to excessive radiation, which is likely to cause problems in later life. One report today from TEPCO (which may not be entirely reliable) claimed that one worker only has received a dose of 150 mSv; all the oyhers were under 100 mSv. We are therefore justified in asking why the politicians have been hysterically jumping to conclusions which are not backed up by scientific evidence.

There may be many reasons for this including the desire for re-election next time round. This creates a vicious circle in that the media, quoting the politician, furthers the misconception. This in turn influences the grand public who are more likely to vote for the politician for taking a strong stand against the "nuclear menace". There is also a possibility that the politician may be influenced by civil servants or others who are themselves eco-politicians, members of the "green" party or certain NGOs and take a strong anti-nuclear stand. Also, very few scientists or engineers have official positions where they are able to advise the politician, who therefore sees only one side of the argument.

Meanwhile, low levels of radioactive contamination have been detected in some food products from the Fukushima prefecture. According to official sources, this applies to both milk and spinach but there is no risk in consuming them; notwithstanding, there is a possibility they may be banned as an extra precaution. As far as I know, no seafood has been classed as contaminated, despite the fact that most emitted radioactive particles would have been blown out to sea. I have little doubt that they would have been dispersed and diluted in the vast quantities of seawater, so that it would seem unlikely that fish would be affected. On the other hand, I could easily imagine that shellfish, close to the shore, could accumulate a certain amount of contamination.

The media have also exaggerated the significance of the "radioactive cloud", notably over Tokyo. It is true that there has been an increase over the natural background level in Tokyo and elsewhere round Fukushima. This increase has hardly been measurable at distances over a few tens of kilometres from the plant. It represents no danger to the population. The total natural plus increased levels are less than the natural levels in many densely populated places throughout the world. The mass exodus from Tokyo is totally unjustified and can be classed as paranoid. The similar exodus from the Fukushima prefecture is more understandable but also unnecessary, at least beyond the evacuation zone.

So, let's get back to Europe. I shall take the example of Switzerland, partly because I am more familiar with power generation there but mainly because the Mühleberg power station is almost identical in size, manufacturer, construction and age to the Fukushima number one reactor. Any lesson that can be learnt from the latter could therefore be applied to the former. The day following the disaster, the ministerial head of the Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, Doris Leuthard, announced:

• examination of the safety procedures of the existing nuclear power stations
• elimination of life extensions for the existing nuclear power stations
• suspension of the procedures for the approval of three new nuclear power stations

Obviously, this was a panic decision, although the first of these three measures should be a permanent instruction at all power stations, nuclear or otherwise. The announcement of the other two should have been made only after a period of due reflection, or – better – perhaps not at all! Nothing can be gained from panicking. A number of other countries, including Germany, made similar panic announcements. Even worse, a paranoia engendered by the use of the word nuclear must be avoided, at all costs. To some extent, this already exists, due to exaggerations from certain NGOs and the media. This can be illustrated by a much publicised report in the media, a few years ago, when a steam line in the turbine room of a nuclear-power station burst, killing two workers. This was widely reported with a strong emphasis on the fact that it was at a nuclear-power station, even though it was remote from any reactor. Similar accidents occur from time to time in conventional power stations, but never get reported in national media.

Now, let's have a look at Mühleberg. This power station is situated in a valley about 20 km from Berne. The region is not noted for seismic activity but this can never be ruled out in a mountainous country like Switzerland. The Swiss Seismological Service has very recently published the following:

10 lessons for Switzerland

1. magnitude 9 events or the type of strong motions produced by the Tohoku event are not possible in Switzerland
2. magnitude 6.3 events like the Christchurch earthquake are possible and expected in Switzerland every 80 to 100 years. Magnitude 6 events are the main contributor to Swiss hazard for normal houses; magnitude 6.5 to 7 events are the main contributor for the hazard of critical infrastructures
3. the motion is recorded in the Christchurch earthquake largely exceed the parameters of the Swiss building code. We should consider increasing the level of protection in the building code from 475 years to 1000 years, at least for urban developments.
4. the seismic building codes in Japan and New Zealand worked very well, with minimal damage to new houses; it is urgent that the Swiss code becomes obligatory for all cantons of Switzerland, with appropriate verification mechanisms.
5. the open availability of high-quality, dense data is the key to understand the complexity of events such as the Christchurch and Tohoku earthquakes; Switzerland should actively pursue the installation of monitoring stations and warning systems in cities as well as in critical infrastructures (nuclear-power stations dams, geothermal projects, buildings).
6. we shall need to take a more conservative approach in the identification of rare, extreme events, taking into consideration the failures and New Zealand (unidentified fault) and Japan (unidentified potential for magnitude 9 events).
7. Swiss lakes have a history of damaging tsunamis (i.e. Luzern 1601) which have never been taken into proper consideration; a comprehensive hazard and risk analysis for urban areas on Swiss lake shores is needed.
8. the risk associated to near-surface or surface break of identified faults as well as of possible deep shearing zones still needs to be evaluated.
9. the vast damage to key Japanese infrastructures (nuclear-power stations, dams, harbours, communication,…) confirms the intrinsic vulnerability of modern society to large earthquakes; comprehensive risk assessments are required to verify the level of seismic risk for critical infrastructures in Switzerland.
10. The economic damage produced by events such as the magnitude 6.3 Christchurch event poses the urgent need to value the economic risk and install appropriate financial mechanisms (i.e. obligatory insurance coverage) to cover rare, potentially disastrous events in Switzerland.

It is therefore apparent that even the oldest 1971 nuclear-power station would be unaffected by the most powerful earthquake that is possible in Switzerland; it should be mentioned that the most seismically active zones are in the Alpine arc, notably in the Valais and Grison cantons. Very minor tremors are a daily occurrence, usually magnitude 1 to 2. Another potentially seismically active zone is around Basel, where a magnitude 3 quake was caused during drilling of a geothermal well a couple of years ago. None of the existing nuclear-power stations are in seismically active zones.

Recalling that the Fukushima problems were not caused by the Tohoku earthquake but by the resultant tsunami, is there a lesson to be learnt from this for Switzerland? Obviously, as there are no major bodies of water close to any of the power stations, a tsunami is not possible. However, they are all situated in river valleys and the risk of floods from other causes should be evaluated. In particular, Mühleberg is in a deeper and steeper-sided valley than the other nuclear-power stations. Is it possible, for a landslide to dam the valley downstream from the station, causing water levels to rise with consequent flooding? The risk is probably extremely small but perhaps not entirely negligible. This is a possibility that may be examined in various countries. Another potential problem would be dams bursting upstream from nuclear-power stations, causing a flood. This possibility is far from negligible, either because the dams themselves cede, for any reason, or because of a landslide falling into the reservoir.

While on the subject of dams, it should be mentioned that about 250,000 people have been killed in the last 50 years because of dams ceding throughout the world. In Switzerland, the largest dam is the Grande Dixence. If that failed, it is probable that upwards of 100,000 persons would be killed and vast areas of fertile land flushed away. It is situated in an earthquake zone and is built to pretty much the same standards as nuclear-power stations. It has one advantage over the latter in that its position and shape are constantly monitored on the ground and by satellite; at the slightest danger, procedures are in place to empty the dam harmlessly.

About 40% of Switzerland's electricity is generated from nuclear-power stations. It would be impossible to replace this by hydroelectricity because most of the suitable sites are already exploited. Similarly, other renewable sources could never meet the shortfall, even with the a large expansion of the existing waste-to-energy programme. If Switzerland becomes nuclear-free, it would have to resort to using fossil fuels; quite apart from the carbon dioxide emissions, this would not be a popular move.

What I have written about the Swiss situation can be extrapolated to nearly any other country. Obviously, there are individual cases which may merit some particular action. For example, where nuclear-power stations are sited close to the sea, authorities may wish to evaluate the risk of tsunamis and, if necessary, build higher seawalls for protection.

In conclusion, I urge every country with nuclear-power stations to ensure that maximum safety is the top priority. If necessary, nuclear plants should be shut down permanently if maximum levels of safety cannot be guaranteed or shut down temporarily while those levels are reached. Above all, I suggest that governments and other regulatory authorities make no panic decisions because of Fukushima. They should also avoid propagating paranoia to the media. This is not to say that they should put their heads in the sand by ignoring the problems. It is possible to reassure the public that nuclear-power is safe despite everything that has happened in Japan over the last 10 days. In my opinion, this is a more sensible approach than that of many sources of misinformation and disinformation. To answer the question in the title, Fukushima must never be allowed to kill nuclear-power.